

FIGHTER SQUADRON ONE HUNDRED FOURTEEN

FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

96601

VF114/JEP:gs
5750-1
20 February 1976

From: Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron ONE HUNDRED
FOURTEEN
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-0502)
Subj: Fighter Squadron ONE HUNDRED FOURTEEN Command History,
Calendar Year 1975; submission of
Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 5750.12
Encl: (1) VF-114 Command History, Calendar Year 1975
1. The subject command history, enclosure (1), is submitted
in accordance with reference (a).


Walter J. DAVIS, Jr.

Copy to:
CNO (OP-09B9)
CINCPACFLT
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMFITAEEWINGPAC

FIGHTER SQUADRON ONE HUNDRED FOURTEEN

COMMAND HISTORY

1975

Enclosure (1)

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PART I

VF-114 CHRONOLOGY 1975

JAN 6-15:	CARQUAL, USS KITTY HAWK
JAN:	Project Have Idea
MAR 20-31	RIMPAC, USS KITTY HAWK
MAY 7-18:	WEPTRAEX, USS KITTY HAWK
MAY 21:	Deployed to WESTPAC, USS KITTY HAWK
SEP:	READIEX 1-76, Philippine Sea
OCT:	Northern Excursion, Sea of Japan
DEC 14:	Return to CONUS from WESTPAC
DEC 15:	Begin post cruise standown
DEC 15-31:	Prepare for transistion to F-14's

Enclosure (1)

PART II
NARRATIVES

ENCLOSURE **10/10**

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SECTION A

OPERATIONS NARRATIVE

1. The year can be broken into two major time frames for FITRON 114 chronology. January through May was a period of training and preparation for the upcoming deployment. May through December was spent on cruise in WESTPAC.
2. In January the aircrews participated in carrier qualifications aboard the USS KITTY HAWK (CV-63). Two aircrews were fortunate to be able to take part in a joint Navy-Air Force Air Combat Maneuvering Project (ACM) during January. Fighter Squadron ONE HUNDRED FOURTEEN, after rigorous training flying, then boarded the KITTY HAWK from 20 February through 31 March for RIMPAC exercises and from 7-18 May for Weapons Training Exercises (WEPTRAEX).
3. Fighter Squadron ONE HUNDRED FOURTEEN deployed on 21 May 1975 aboard USS KITTY HAWK (CV-63) with ten F-4J aircraft assigned. Initial flight operations were conducted in the Hawaii Operating Area with emphasis placed upon day and night carrier landing proficiency. F-4J flight operations were curtailed, however, following the loss of a squadron aircraft due to a catastrophic material failure. The aircrew safely ejected and were successfully rescued within ten minutes of ejection. The accident led to a CNO directive grounding all F-4J aircraft pending inspection of the affected area.
4. A routine transit to the Western Pacific was interrupted on 13 June when two squadron aircraft were launched from an Alert FIVE status to successfully intercept and escort two Russian BEAR aircraft flying in the vicinity of KITTY HAWK.
5. Inport Subic Bay, R. P., every effort was made to complete the CNO ordered inspection of all F-4J aircraft. The inspection consisted of removal, inspection and replacement of the stabilator actuator horn in each aircraft. Following an expeditious inspection and maintenance check flights, the squadron implemented a shorebased training program consisting of area familiarization, round-robin instrument/navigation, air intercept control (AIC), air combat maneuvering (ACM) and day/night FMLP sorties. This syllabus provided a review of the Philippine operating area including its geographical features and an opportunity to exercise the aircrews in basic mission accomplishment. Completion of this syllabus by all aircrews was mandatory prior to the first at-sea period.

Enclosure (1)

6. The first two days of the initial WESTPAC at-sea period were devoted to day/night refresher carrier landings. The necessity to schedule refresher carrier landings continued throughout the cruise due to a reduced tempo of at-sea operations induced by shipboard engineering problems, ship's operating schedule, and frequent in-port periods. During the first at-sea period, the cycle time was 1 + 45 which resulted in flights of two hours. This limited mission assignments to FORCAP/BARCAP and AIC roles. The length of the flights plus the limited available airborne fuel forced an aircraft utilization best characterized by maximum endurance fuel management.

7. Returning to Subic Bay in mid July the squadron flew missions intended to upgrade aircrew proficiency to an acceptable level. An operating routine similar to the pre-cruise Miramar period was established which set the precedent for all future inport periods. A training schedule and an in-port LOI were published and implemented while inport. The daily flight schedule included high energy intercept missions, basic navigation and dissimilar and similar ACM. Dissimilar ACM training was accomplished within the air wing with the A-7 and A-6 squadrons.

8. The squadron participated in NEWBOY in early July and late November with the Philippine Air Defense Command; Operation COPE THUNDER with the 13th Air Force in late July; READIEX 1-76 in late August; and MULTIPLEX 2-76 in mid November. READIEX 1-76 provided an opportunity to perform fleet defense and surface search missions under EMCOM conditions in a "Bluewater" environment. During the transit of the Sea of Japan in October, the squadron completed five intercepts of RUSSIAN BADGER aircraft. All was not work, however, 13-20 August found the squadron enjoying the sights of Hong Kong and 17-24 October we were enjoying the sights of Yokosuka, Japan.

9. Fighter Squadron ONE HUNDRED FOURTEEN conducted three missile shoots during the cruise. A Sidewinder MISSILEX was conducted on 31 May on the Pacific Missile Range at Barking Sands. On 25 July, a second Sidewinder MISSILEX was conducted on the Poro Point Missile Range. On 29 September, a Sparrow/Sidewinder MISSILEX at Poro Point resulted in the shooting down of a BQM-34A. The MISSILEXs provided semi-realistic air-to-air training in that the drone was maneuvered as an ACM target. Weapon system verification was an added feature as each missile expended was from a different firing aircraft.

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10. The transit back to CONUS began on 26 November when the KITTY HAWK departed Subic Bay. The time period enroute to Pearl Harbor was uneventful, even though full alert posture was maintained in expectation of Russian overflights. After an overnight stay in Pearl on 8 December, the HAWK steamed into San Diego on 15 December. FITRON 114 officers and men spent the period of 9-14 December entertaining guests during the "Operation Tiger"; a program under which male relatives are allowed to ride the ship from Pearl Harbor to San Diego.

11. In October, Fighter Squadron ONE HUNDRED FOURTEEN received the good news that upon return to CONUS, the squadron would transition to the F-14 Tomcat. The time frame of 15-31 December, besides being a standdown from flight operations, was marked by preparation for the upcoming change of aircraft.

SECTION B

MAINTENANCE NARRATIVE

1. The start of 1975 found Fighter Squadron ONE HUNDRED FOURTEEN at the close of a comprehensive aircraft modification and modernization program. This extensive and ambitious program required major aircraft disassembly and necessitated the services of Naval Reserve Field Team personnel. As a result, only limited aircraft assets for training had been available for the past six months. Notwithstanding, a rigorous pilot refresher training program was in full swing. Increased productivity from the entire Maintenance Department was put forth to offset the impact of the modification program. Operational commitments were achieved and were on schedule as a direct result of the superior dedication and technical expertise of FITRON 114's Maintenance Officers and men.
2. A comprehensive tool control program was devised and implemented under the direction of the Quality Assurance Officer LCDR (b) (6). This program also had the additional benefit of saving over \$2000.00 in excess tools.
3. The Maintenance Department was reviewed by the COMNAVAIR-PAC Maintenance Management Advisory Team and was declared OUTSTANDING in maintenance control procedures. Shortly thereafter, the Commanding Officer, CDR R. S. PARKER, led a three aircraft detachment to Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, for a comprehensive fighter to fighter operational evaluation in the combat environment. In charge of the Maintenance Detachment for both FITRON 114 and FITRON 213 was LT (b) (6). During this period an intensive flight schedule was maintained without a single lost sortie. The outstanding dedication of FITRON 114 maintenance personnel in accomplishing that evolution record was commended in a letter from the Commanding Officer of AIRTEVRON 4.
4. Simultaneously, with the completion of the indepth aircraft modification program and the Fighter Detachment to Nellis AFB, a multi-plane missile firing exercise was conducted. High F-4J Fire Control Systems availability indicated the hard work and dedication put forth by all hands for this successful operation. A successful Integrated Weapons System Review and Conventional Weapons Technical Proficiency Inspection concluded FITRON 114's shore phase of the turn-around cycle.
5. Carrier qualification work-ups and refreshers were supported in February by a detachment of maintenance personnel on board the USS KITTY HAWK and all requirements were met with safety.

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6. In April an outstanding aircraft availability rate was experienced during the annual RIMPAC Exercise conducted in the Hawaiian Operating Area. Missile firing exercises and night flying operations were safely and successfully flown due to the quality product of the Maintenance Department. Immediately following the MIDPAC deployment, the WEPTRAEX/ORE Evaluations were conducted off of Southern California, and again the FITRON 114 maintenance personnel rose to the occasion by providing maximum operational and full-system fighter aircraft. Following these carrier operations, an indepth Maintenance and Aircraft Material Inspection was conducted by COMFITAEEWWINGPAC. A culmination of nine months of hard work was directly apparent and resulted in an overall outstanding grade in Maintenance Control, and aircraft condition. FITRON 114 deployed for WESTPAC on 21 May 1975.

7. A twenty-four hour alert posture was maintained enroute to WESTPAC and was supported with full system aircraft which were required to launch during overflight conditions. Outstanding systems reliability was achieved during the transit. Upon arrival Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines, intensive area refresher flights were conducted. Aircraft Maintenance conditions were primitive; however, due to dedication and application all requirements were met. Shortly after arrival at Subic Bay, all Navy F-4's were grounded due to a series of accidents in which the stabilator input horn was determined to be faulty. FITRON 114 had one of these accidents, films of which helped to pinpoint the cause. Immediate remedy of the deficiency commenced upon reaching port. A team effort by NARF North Island, McDonnell-Douglas, FAWPRA, COMFAIRWESTPAC, and FITRON 114 personnel resulted in the expeditious inspection and repair of all squadron aircraft with minimum impact on operational readiness.

8. An intensive Corrosion Control Program was continuously in progress. FITRON 114 aircraft earned a grade of satisfactory at the mid-cruise Maintenance Material Inspection. Simultaneously, maintenance administrative functions were rated outstanding. Two more complete corrosion control cycles were completed prior to the end of the cruise.

9. The VF-114 Maintenance Department installed an intercom communications system to CAG, Flight Deck, Ordnance Control, Supply Inter-Office including S-6 and other air wing squadrons. Additionally, the squadron Maintenance Control was connected to all workcenters. The intercom facilitated rapid reliable communications. As an example, supply orders are now placed by the intercom, greatly decreasing supply response time. The system was installed as a self help program.

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10. The duration of the deployment was spent conducting short intensive at-sea periods coupled with equally intensive in-port flying schedules. In order to adequately meet and support operational flying with the maintenance facilities continuously moving between ship and shore, the FITRON 114 Maintenance Department was called upon to show reserve under pressure, dedication, and single mindedness as to purpose. As a unit, each man exhibited those traits.
11. The 1975 WESTPAC cruise brought to a close a period of dedication and professionalism displayed in a time frame of decreasing assets and limited funding. The material condition of valuable F-4 fighter aircraft was preserved as a direct result of the outstanding efforts of the FITRON 114 working men.

PART III
SECTION C
STATISTICS

1. FLIGHT/AIRCRAFT ON BOARD

ENCLOSURE (1)

A. Flight Summary

	<u>DAY HR</u>	<u>NIGHT HR</u>	<u>TRAPS</u>	
			<u>DAY</u>	<u>NIGHT</u>
JAN	254.3	96.3	21	7
FEB	175.8	32.0	-	-
MAR	253.2	38.7	120	24
APR	215.1	69.2	94	34
MAY	104.3	12.0	20	4
JUN	55.1	17.2	-	-
JUL	229.3	81.2	106	37
AUG	98.7	28.7	56	15
SEP	178.0	90.3	84	47
OCT	108.1	33.2	56	22
NOV	149.2	7.6	64	1
DEC	24.0	-	-	-

B. Aircraft on Board

JAN - MAY	16
MAY - DEC	10

ENCLOSURE (2)

PART III
SECTION C
STATISTICS
2. ORDNANCE

ENCLOSURE (1)

1975 ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE

	MK 76	MK 106	ZUNI	SP III	S/W	CHAFF	ITEM'S DROPPED MONTHLY
JAN						75	75
FEB		66	66			103	235
MAR				1	2		3
APR			1	2	2		5
MAY					1		1
JUN							0
JUL				1		519	520
AUG							0
SEP	12			1	2	294	309
OCT							0
NOV	23					244	267
DEC							0
TOTAL	35	66	67	5	7	1,235	1,415

ENCLOSURE (1)

PART III
SECTION C
STATISTICS
3. AWARDS

ENCLOSURE (/)

AWARDS & MEDALS

AMCS (b) (6) Navy Commendation Medal
YN1 (b) (6) Certificate of Achievement COMTRAPAC
AT1 (b) (6) Letter of Commendation CHNAVEDTRA
AE1 (b) (6) Letter of Commendation USS AMERICA
AE2 (b) (6) Letter of Commendation USS AMERICA
AQ2 (b) (6) Letter of Commendation USS CONSTELLATION
AMH2 (b) (6) Letter of Commendation USS KITTY HAWK
AMH3 (b) (6) Letter of Commendation FITRON 213
CS3 (b) (6) Letter of Appreciation USS KITTY HAWK

ENCLOSURE (1)

PART III

SECTION C

STATISTICS

4. AIRCRAFT LOST/DAMAGED DURING CALENDAR YEAR 1975

ENCLOSURE (1)

Aircraft Lost/Damaged During Calendar Year 1975

<u>DATE</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>BUNO</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>CAUSE</u>	<u>DAMAGE</u>
29MAY75	F4J	157243	Hawaii, Op Area	Stab Actuator Failure	ALPHA*

*ALPHA - Lost at sea

ENCLOSURE (1)

FIGHTER SQUADRON ONE HUNDRED FOURTEEN
FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
96601



"FIGHTING AARDVARKS"

END OF CRUISE REPORT
MAY 1975 - DECEMBER 1975

ENCLOSURE **100**

1. OPERATIONS:

a. Chronology. Fighter Squadron 114 deployed on 21 May 1978 aboard USS KITTY HAWK (CV-63) with ten F-4J aircraft assigned. Initial flight operations were conducted in the Hawaii operating area with emphasis placed upon day and night carrier landing proficiency. F-4J flight operations were curtailed, however, following the loss of a squadron aircraft due to a catastrophic material failure. The aircrew safely ejected and were successfully rescued within 10 minutes of ejection. The accident led to a CNO directive curtailing all F-4J aircraft pending inspection of the affected area.

A routine transit to the Western Pacific was interrupted on 15 June when two squadron aircraft were alerted from an alert FIVE status to successfully intercept and escort two Russian BEAR aircraft flying in the vicinity of KITTY HAWK.

Import Subic Bay, A.P., every effort was made to complete the CNO ordered inspection of all F-4J aircraft. The inspection consisted of removal, inspection and replacement of the stabilator actuator horn in each aircraft. Following an expeditious inspection and maintenance check, the squadron implemented a shorebased training program consisting of area familiarization, round-robin instrument/navigation, air intercept control (AIC), air combat maneuvering (ACM) and day/night FMLP sorties. This syllabus provided a review of the Philippine operating area including its geographical features and an opportunity to exercise the aircrews in basic mission accomplishment. Completion of this syllabus by all aircrews was mandatory prior to the first at-sea period.

The first two days of the initial WESTPAC at-sea period were devoted to day/night refresher carrier landings. The necessity to schedule refresher landings continued throughout the cruise due to a reduced tempo of at-sea operations induced by shipboard engineering problems, shifting operating schedule, and frequent in-port periods. As a result, most of the desired refresher periods were not realized but were replaced by commencement of cyclic operations which followed the initial fly-aboard of shore based squadron aircraft. This adversely impacted pilot proficiency and especially affected the less experienced pilots. The occasional refresher periods were characterized by cycling squadron aircraft to and from the beach to facilitate deck operations which were degraded by the high deck multiple required by the CV concept.

During the first at-sea period, the cycle time was 1 + 45 which resulted in flights of two hours. This limited mission assignments to FORCAP/MARCAP and AIC roles. The length of the flights plus the limited available airbase fuel forced

an aircraft utilization best characterized by maximum endurance fuel management. Training during these flights was negligible in that intercepts were low energy profiles. The result was a degraded capability for aircrews, airborne controllers (A-7) and shipboard operators.

Returning to Subic Bay, the squadron flew missions intended to upgrade aircrew proficiency to an acceptable level. An operating routine similar to the pre-cruise Miramar period was established which set the precedent for all future in-port periods. A training schedule and an in-port LOI were published and implemented while in-port. The daily flight schedule included high energy intercept missions, basic navigation and dissimilar and similar ACM. Dissimilar ACM training was accomplished within the air wing with the A-7 and A-6 squadrons. Despite a requirement to retain a portion of the squadron aircraft aboard the ship, considerable valuable training was gained during the in-port periods.

There were two attempts to improve the quality of training during shipboard operations. One was to adjust the daily air plan beginning with a single, hour long cycle followed by a 1 + 30 cyclic schedule. This schedule permitted more realistic AIC/ACM training and reduced the requirement for air refueling. The other attempt consisted of launching two F-4J aircraft early in a scheduled launch to engage a returning section of aircraft (usually A-7) in ACM. The dissimilar aircraft had launched during the previous cycle and had briefed with the F-4J aircrews. Following ACM, both sections landed aboard during the ongoing recovery. This evolution, termed ACM YO-YO, provided maximum training for aircrews and air controllers by simulating a realistic scenario in which a threat (A-7 raid) was met with a coordinated ship-aircraft vector followed by multi-plane ACM.

Adjusting the daily flight plan soon proved unsatisfactory because of the high deck multiple. Pre-launch respot of aircraft consumed much of the airborne period. The 1 + 45 cycle was reinstated for the remainder of the cruise. The ACM YO-YO sorties then became the prime training vehicle. Unfortunately, the full potential of the ACM YO-YO sorties was never realized because they were only occasionally assigned. The squadron regards three ACM sorties per pilot per week necessary to maintain ACM proficiency. Applicable training instructions demand an ACM warmup period if seven days elapse between ACM sorties. Because of the lack of proper emphasis regarding fighter training, the squadron was forced to report a degraded proficiency status (C-2) in its primary fighter role for the final three months of the cruise.

The squadron participated in NEWBOY in early July and late November with the Philippine Air Defense Command; Operation COPE THUNDER with the 13th Air Force in late July; READEX 1-76 in late August; and MULTIPLEX 2-76 in mid-November. READEX 1-76 provided an opportunity to perform fleet defense and surface search missions under EMCON conditions in a "blue-water" environment. During the transit of the Sea of Japan in October, the squadron completed five intercepts of RUSSIAN BADGER aircraft.

FITRON 114 conducted three missile shoots during the cruise. A Sidewinder MISSILEX was conducted on 31 May on the Pacific Missile Range at Barking Sands. On 25 July, a second Sidewinder MISSILEX was conducted on the Poro Point Missile Range. On 29 September, a Sparrow/Sidewinder MISSILEX at Poro Point resulted in the shooting down of a BQM-34A. The MISSILEXs provided semi-realistic air-to-air training in that the drone was maneuvered as an ACM target. Weapon system verification was an added feature as each missile expended was from a different firing aircraft.

b. Cruise Statistics.

(1) Total Flight Hours	DAY 830.3	NIGHT 262.6
(2) Total Shipboard Flight Hours ..	604.8	214.1
(3) Total Shore Based Flight Hours.	225.5	48.5
(4) Total Flight Hours each Month		
MAY	54.0	Total For Cruise .. 1092.9
JUN	72.4	Average Flight
JUL	310.5	Hours/Month 156
AUG	127.4	
SEP	268.3	
OCT	141.3	
NOV	119.0	
(5) Average Shipboard Hours	DAY	NIGHT
Per Pilot.....	50.4	17.8
(6) Average Shorebased Hours		
Per Pilot	18.7	4.0
(7) Average Number of Flight Hours		
Per Pilot Per Month.....	13.0	
(8) Total Carrier Landings (CGLS, TRAPS, TEG'S, BOLTERS)	443	148

(9) Total Traps 493

(10) Average Carrier Landing	DAY	NIGHT
Per Pilot	37.3	12.3

(11) Carrier Landing Per Pilot		
Each Month	5.3	1.7

(12) Ordnance Expended:

MK 76	18 Expended
	0 Hung

AIM 9	3 Expended
	0 Hung

AIM 7	2 Expended
	0 Hung

c. Specific Problems.

PROBLEM: The frequency and duration of the inport periods necessitated carrier refresher landings at the beginning of each at-sea period.

DISCUSSION: Pilots' day/night carrier landing proficiency suffered because of reduced operating periods at sea and the frequent ten to fourteen day in-port periods. To prepare each pilot for an at-sea period, each in-port period was concluded with intensive night FMLP. A carrier landing refresher period was scheduled at the beginning of each at-sea period. However, most of the expected carrier refresher periods were not realized. The initial fly-aboard of aircraft following an inport period was characterized by a single touch-and-go and a trap, or a trap only. Running the deck, i.e., a trap followed by a catapult, etc., was a rare event. Switch crews were never used. This necessitated selective flight scheduling of aircrews until later in the at-sea period when all aircrews were fully qualified. During two line periods, the goal of refreshing all aircrews was not reached.

RECOMMENDATION: Proper emphasis must be renewed regarding carrier landing proficiency. During periods of reduced at-sea operating time, refresher periods must be mandatory.

PROBLEM: The 1 + 45 cycle times reduced inflight mission training/proficiency to an unacceptable level.

DISCUSSION: Aircrew mission training was minimal due to cycle length and a paucity of airborne fuel. The 1 + 45 cycle time

forced a "max conserve" technique throughout the flight which denied any realistic training apart from basic proficiency flying. Although most sorties were allocated 1500# of fuel, this only allowed the aircrew to land aboard with the desired fuel reserve. Thus, nearly all 1 + 45 sorties were AIC, FORCAP/BARCAP flights characterized by minimum angle of bank turns, slow airspeeds and altitudes required to conserve fuel. Realistic intercepts (i.e., high-to-low, low-to-high, etc.) were not performed and ACM was out of the question. This was true throughout the cruise. Aircrew ACM and Fleet Defense Proficiency degenerated during each at-sea period and throughout the cruise. At the conclusion of the cruise, the squadron was reporting a degraded proficiency status for training.

RECOMMENDATION: The ship must be prepared to either adjust the cycle length or provide additional airborne fuel if fighter training is to be accomplished. Realistic training of the Fleet Air Defense element of the Air Wing would also provide additional training to the shipboard and airborne controllers. Reducing the length of the first cycle to one hour, allowing more ACM YO-YO sorties and providing more airborne refueling are preferable alternatives to the apparent disregard of the fighter community and its primary mission of Fleet Air Defense.

PROBLEM: Fighter utilization during periods of total EMCON (EMCON A) was ineffective due to a lack of responsive command and control.

DISCUSSION: READEX 1-76 introduced the concept of total EMCON (EMCON A) while remaining responsive to a hostile threat. The heavy emphasis upon EMCON resulted in fighters being launched with little information regarding their mission. Fighters frequently launched, established a CAP position, and returned to the ship for recovery with no control. Launching of fighters under such conditions reduces the possibility of a positive fighter response to a suspected threat to the level of a chance encounter. Fighter aircraft require at least occasional BOGBY information to effect an intercept.

RECOMMENDATION: EMCON A must be broken or modified if fighters are to be launched. Control may be airborne (4-2) or by a surface unit, (PIRAZ), but there must be control available.

2. MAINTENANCE:

a. Squadron Maintenance.

(1) Professionalism and teamwork of all Aardvark maintenance personnel has been a prime factor in this command's successful completion of the 1975 WESTPAC cruise with no injury or loss of life. Thirteen major pre-cruise modifications, including AFC 524 and 541, precluded bringing the aircraft to that degree of readiness normally expected prior to sail. Command emphasis and the use of system status cards have ensured utilization and test of all aircraft systems on every flight, whether necessary for the mission or not, both in an effort to increase operational readiness and to stay on top of "UP" GRIPES.

(2) A major tool control program consisting of shadow boxes, special pouches, frequent inventories, and prescribed markings was instituted. The loss of tools was greatly decreased, and the overall cost of tools was lowered considerably.

b. OP Ready Reporting. Discussions with CVW-11 and CTF-77 helped delineate and clarify OP Ready Reporting so that higher authority could more meaningfully determine the actual degree of fighter aircraft readiness. This enabled proper goal setting and assisted the squadron in having its supply deficiencies recognized. As a result, readiness was emphasized and improved.

c. F-4 Grounding. Immediately upon arrival at Subic Bay, R. P. all Navy F-4's were grounded due to a series of accidents in which the stabilator input horn was determined to be faulty. FITRON 114 had one of these accidents, films of which helped to pin point the cause. Immediate remedy of the deficiency commenced upon reaching port. A team effort by NARF North Island, McDONNELL-DOUGLAS, FAWPRA, COMFAIRWEST-PAC, and FITRON 114 personnel resulted in the expeditious inspection and repair of all squadron aircraft with minimum impact on operational readiness.

d. Special Inspections. Two major aircraft bulletins (IACC-473 and IAFB-186C) requiring special inspections were expeditiously incorporated by FITRON 114 assisted by KITTY HAWK and AMD FAWPRA personnel. However, incorporation of these bulletins degraded aircraft readiness and recent message traffic indicates that IAFB-186C may have been premature and unneeded.

e. Depot Level Support. The vital depot level assistance rendered by FAWPRA significantly reduced aircraft down time

on those maintenance requirements which were beyond squadron capability. Mr. Walt Thompson showed concern for squadron needs and willingly accepted difficult work requests. COMFAIRWESTPAC and NAESU were very responsive when technical assistance was required on three occasions. The expertise of the representatives dispatched was of the highest order.

f. Corrosion Program. An intensive corrosion control program was continuously in progress. FITRON 114 aircraft earned an aircraft grade of satisfactory at the MID-CRUISE MAINTENANCE MATERIAL INSPECTION. Simultaneously, maintenance administrative functions were rated outstanding. All aircraft have completely undergone another corrosion preventative maintenance cycle since the MID-CRUISE inspection and will complete another full cycle prior to arrival in CONUS.

g. Personnel.

(1) Personnel manning was aggravated by two situations. First, precruise deficiencies in squadron manning were met by ordering personnel of the decommissioned FITRON 92 and 96 squadrons into the squadron; however, these personnel did not arrive until mid-cruise. Second, after the squadron was designated for transition to the F-14, gains were largely curtailed and incoming personnel were ordered to F-14 training.

(2) TAD requirements increased throughout the cruise. Some of the requirements generated during the cruise were Admiral's Ladder cleaning, additional MAA, Habitability and additional Supply personnel.

(3) The requirement for supplying these personnel had an adverse effect on the flexibility and utilization of personnel for maintenance. For example, squadrons cannot operate properly with only one organizational storekeeper. Resultant inadequacies are: no night check AK, no shipboard AK when one is assigned ashore, reduced opportunity for leave (this becomes critical with the large numbers of Filipino personnel in the AK rating), no opportunity for the AK to train a striker for the other shift, marginal off-shift supply requisitioning due to inadequately trained personnel.

(4) The squadron was especially effected by a shortage of AE and AO personnel. This shortage was identified and pursued unsuccessfully prior to the cruise.

(5) Flight Deck Hazardous Duty Pay is sorely inadequate (49 sets). Sixty sets of FDHP are considered necessary for an operational F-4 squadron.

h. Communications. An intercom type communications system was installed to connect CAG, Flight Deck, Ordnance Control, Supply S-6 Division and squadrons. Additionally the squadron maintenance control was connected with all the squadron work centers. Previous communications between these centers was limited to inadequate telephones (and in some cases, radio). The intercom has facilitated rapid, reliable communications. As an example, supply orders are now placed by the intercom, greatly decreasing supply response time. The system was installed as a self help project; the intercom was purchased by the Supply Department and the squadron provided the installation.

i. Supply Support. Poor stock levels, poor supply response and inaccurate location filing were problems manifested in a high mid-cruise cannibalization rate of 250 items/month. Supply support improved gradually during the latter half of the cruise. The incorporation of an intercommunications system (paragraph h) somewhat alleviated the supply response time. On several occasions parts were found when supply encouraged squadron personnel to conduct a search of stockrooms for unfilled requisitions. The increased training level and improved stability of supply personnel also appeared to contribute to better response.

j. AMD Support. The F-4J support given by AMD was outstanding in quality of workmanship and service. For many items the mean time between failure of items processed by them has improved over last cruise. Unfortunately, a greater AMD capability (increase of the number of parts on the AMD repair list) contributed to an overall slower parts support response. The poor supply response time to AMD resulted in a delay in determining BCM (parts) status and thereby a further delay in ordering the part, contributing to a greater overall supply response time. This problem can only be alleviated by insuring proper supply support to AMD. In addition, there is no ALE 37 CHAFF POD test equipment on board. ASM-20 and ASM-54 cannot be calibrated on board. AOA probes received from AMD are out of calibration because the wind tunnel is not utilized for this necessary function.

k. Deck Multiple/Aircraft Handling.

(1) The high deck multiple effected aircraft maintenance by not allowing timely required aircraft spots for maintenance. Aircraft respots for the purpose of high and low power turnups were particularly difficult to achieve.

(2) The practice of spotting down aircraft on elevator number four or the port bow during flight operations does

nothing to facilitate maintenance. Further, insufficient elevator down traffic during flight quarters eliminates the possibility of returning an aircraft to an up status that same flying day.

(3) An overall reassessment of aircraft handling must be made with an eye toward furthering aircraft readiness. This will greatly increase available flying assets.

1. GSE Equipment. GSE equipment was generally available when needed although AHT-63 hydraulic jennies were in poor condition and frequently had to be turned in for replacement. GSE support to the flight deck must be improved. When items prepositioned there malfunctioned, the aircraft handler must assist in a more timely manner for their replacement.

m. Facilities.

(1) A permanently assigned hangar spot with a dedicated air supply for centerline tank purging is needed. Hangar bay low power turn-ups would greatly facilitate maintenance. For hangar bay turns, a dedicated starting unit is mandatory and could be spotted in the elevator number three well.

(2) Power cables are badly worn and often malfunction. Worn cables impair maintenance actions and constitute a safety hazard. Deck edge power is insufficient on the port side of the bow, and in elevator number four area on the Flight Deck.

n. Ordnance.

(1) There is an inadequate amount of ordnance handling gear such as AERO 12B with Sidewinder adapters, forcing the use of outdated AERO 16B.

(2) The insufficient quantities of missiles broken out or on board for daily missions especially during escalating alert postures, forces minimum manpower to perform many extra up and down loadings to meet commitments.

3. ADMINISTRATION:

a. Berthing/Staterooms.

(1) Most of the squadron was berthed together in spaces convenient to the Ready Room and working areas. The YN/PN/AZ berthing area and berthing for newly arriving personnel were exceptions. YN/PN/AZ personnel were assigned a compartment isolated and lacking in sufficient lockers and shoe racks. Newly arriving personnel were berthed in various division spaces. An effort was made at the beginning of the cruise to exchange one of our smaller compartments for an unfilled larger one, but no exchange was made. Lounge space was insufficient in all berthing compartments. A significant unsuccessful effort was made to obtain a proper number of suitable television sets for the berthing spaces.

(2) Although FITRON 114 was permanently on board, there was insufficient officer stateroom space available. One LTJG spent the entire cruise on board without a stateroom assignment, having to depend on temporary utilization of quarters of officers on leave or TAD.

b. Shore Patrol and other Watches.

(1) The CAG Senior Watch Officer was of great assistance to the squadron throughout the cruise in providing the latest and most accurate information available.

(2) Overscheduling of shore patrol duties inport Subic is the rule rather than the exception. Invariably one or two of the officers assigned were released as soon as they reported for duty. While this is recognized as being better than last minute requests for additional requirements, a closer approximation of need should be attempted.

c. Disbursing. Because of the complex and technical aspects of disbursing procedures, this area presented more administrative problems than all other areas combined. Loss of paperwork after reaching Disbursing was a persistent problem until a logbook system of obtaining receipt for tendered paperwork was devised. In the future, more and continuing liaison between DK's and YN's must be pursued to assure that all parties agree on the proper procedures.

d. Messing.

(1) Enlisted messing was satisfactory except for excessively long lines which caused loss of productive man-hours as well as detracting from morale.

(2) At times the daily changes in dining hours in the Messroom with no apparent causative factors (i.e., changes in flying hours, alert requirements, etc.) was confusing.

e. TAD

(1) The positive and clearly stated emergency leave policies developed by the Airwing midway through the cruise contributed to an orderly processing for the remainder of the cruise.

(2) Obtaining of and accounting for tango numbers presented occasional problems. On several occasions requests for tango numbers were not answered in time to issue proper funded orders. This entailed writing an additional set of no-cost orders as a temporary solution. Once a meaningful dialogue was established between Airwing Staff and squadron Yeoman/Personnelmen the accounting problems decreased markedly.

f. Supplies. To maintain the desired levels of office supplies the squadron utilized the ship's SEAMART for forms, but had to rely on the Subic SERVMART for most of the general office supplies.

g. Advance Parties. Because of this squadron's impending transition, key personnel were required to return to Miramar as a small advanced party. These personnel travelled on no-cost orders because funding was not made available.

h. Human Goals/Affirmative Action Plans. Problems were encountered obtaining suitable spaces for meetings and conferences and in the coordination and availability of training personnel. These problems may be inherent in the crowded and busy atmosphere of carrier operations.

i. Retention

(1) Statistics

(a) Career Personnel Eligible	-----	4
Career Personnel Reenlisted	-----	4
Percent	-----	100
(b) First Term Eligible	-----	53
First Term Reenlisted	-----	25
Percent	-----	44.5

4. SAFETY DEPARTMENT:

a. Aviation Safety.

(1) The Squadron Aviation Safety Program has been oriented around stringent adherence to NATOPS and has worked inseparably with the Operations Department to ensure that all aircrews are thoroughly versed in aircraft systems, NATOPS procedures, and critical emergencies. Maximum use has been made of standdown periods to hold refresher instruction in the above areas. Utilization of outside expertise in the areas of shipboard safety, SAR procedures, and aircraft operations through the use of ship's company, airwing personnel, and visual training aids has been highly stressed.

(2) The following problem areas concerning aviation safety have been noted during the course of the deployment.

(a) Insufficient flight time and carrier landings for fighter aircrews have been minimal. First tour aircrews are especially pressed to develop by the completion of cruise the proficiency in carrier aviation expected of them. This problem has been further amplified by a large, mid-cruise turn-over of flight crews, including the reporting of two nugget pilots and one nugget RIO. Squadron policy of assigning one second tour/cruise crew member to each cockpit has alleviated this problem for the most part, but a significant burden has been placed on squadron operations to raise these aircrews to an acceptable level of proficiency.

(b) Insufficient ACM training. To remain proficient and thereby safe in ACM one must exercise constantly those skills necessary to every fighter aircrew. Two hour cyclic operations does not lend itself to this training. Aircrews have only the short and often negligible inport operating periods to try and regain some measure of proficiency and safety in the highly unforgiving ACM arena.

(c) Insufficient shore based facilities. An entire airwing has one room to brief and debrief missions. No squadron radio is available with which to assist an aircraft experiencing an emergency. Proper and sufficient spaces to store aviators equipment is nonexistent. Although the time spent ashore by deployed squadron has doubled or even tripled since the Vietnam era, the shore facilities have not been enlarged or improved.

b. Maintenance Safety

(1) The Safety program throughout maintenance can be characterized by "attention to detail" from knowledgeable

and dedicated Petty Officers. Strict compliance to the 4790.2 directive and a rigorous Quality Assurance Program have contributed significantly to the overall maintenance safety effort. The ever-present danger inherent with carrier operations can only be remedied by an effective and far-reaching safety program and its strict adherence on an individual level.

(2) Some areas which have provided this command with the means to accomplish its mission and yet meet the required safety measures include the following.

(a) A positive tool control program - instituted at the commencement of this cruise, this has been an invaluable aid in tool accountability and the significant reduction in FOD/MISSILE hazards from lost or misplaced tools.

(b) Enlisted Safety Council - Formal monthly meetings have highlighted the awareness towards safety and have provided for an effective and viable means towards in-depth communication between the various Work Center Safety Petty Officers.

(c) Intercom System - Though greatly enhancing the production effort, the squadron intercom system (installed during this cruise) has provided for the rapid transmittal of information in the form of advice, policy, and procedure. The ability for the rapid and timely processing of information is the mainstay of any successful organization or program.

(d) Quarterly Audits - A revised and detailed Quality Assurance Audit Form has placed particular emphasis on the Work Center Safety Program. The currency and relevancy of prepared work center safety lectures and the availability of safety literature are but two of the items scrutinized to help produce an active safety program within each work center.

(e) Collateral Duty Inspectors - Prior to taking a comprehensive examination each prospective CDI is thoroughly screened at four levels; Work Center Supervisors, Branch/Division CPO, Branch/Division Officers, and finally the Quality Assurance Officer. This procedure has provided the command with the necessary talent and maturity required for this critical job.

(3) Problem areas encountered during the cruise stemmed principally from operations conducted at NAS Cubi Point, R. P. Over sixty days of flight operations were conducted at Cubi with the following major discrepancies.

(a) Maintenance spaces - An archaic Quonset hut, of approximately 600 square feet, was used to house the entire maintenance effort of both fighter squadrons.

(b) Hangar area - One half-sized and dilapidated hangar was all that was available for an entire air wing of, nearly 100 aircraft.

(c) GSE - GSE support was poor.

(d) Communications - Third party communication has to be utilized via the one ship - to - shore telephone line and walkie-talkies connected to flight deck control. The inability to communicate rapidly and accurately between maintenance ashore and maintenance afloat had debilitating effects on the entire maintenance effort. With the re-emergence of the peace time cruise, and the longer in-port periods at NAS Cubi Point it is recommended that funding be made available for appropriate maintenance/hangar space for a carrier-based squadron. The physical conditions which maintenance personnel are now required to work under are totally and emphatically unsatisfactory. It bears the seed from which unsafe practices and accidents can and will occur.

c. General Safety. General safety has been concentrated around flight deck operations, electrical safety, and dangers peculiar to shipboard living. Of primary concern was combating mid-cruise complacency. This was accomplished through the use of safety standdowns as concentrated training and refresher periods. Ship's company personnel were used extensively in presentations and instruction on flight deck hazards, survival equipment, and electrical hazards. Branch officers and supervisors were responsible for a continuous training program of shop safety, first aid, and emergency egress procedures. The major problem area was occasional shortages in supply of safety related items such as emergency battle lantern batteries.

5. SHOREBASED:

a. Operations. The FITRON 114 Operations Department implemented a flight training schedule during each in-port period with the exceptions of Hong Kong and Yokosuka. Much of the coordination occurred within the squadron and was similar to operations conducted at Miramar. Two problem areas were noted early in the cruise which were never satisfactorily resolved; ship-shore communications and aircrew transportation.

(1) Because the ship regularly used Alava pier, the requirement for an effective ship-shore communication system surfaced during the first in-port period. Information regarding aircrew or aircraft changes, scheduling changes and routine administrative items were often delayed, lost, or neglected due to the inadequate nature of the existing communication system. A single telephone line from the beach facility to the shipboard Air Wing office was just not adequate. Walkie-talkies were helpful but in short supply. A means to directly link the squadron beach detachment to the shipboard Squadron Duty Officer must be provided during future deployments.

(2) Aircrew transportation between NAS Cubi Point and Alava Pier remained a problem throughout the cruise. Although a bus ran frequently between the beach and the ship, its schedule was occasionally sporadic due to early or late departures and meal breaks. The result was that aircrews often were forced to resort to taxi cabs with their attendant waiting lines. Early morning or late night flights (i.e., FMLP's) had no transportation available. Hitchhiking, taxi cabs, waiting for another bus, etc. were frequent frustrations to aircrews for whom extra time was often not an available luxury.

In the future, additional transportation dedicated to aircrews must be provided.

b. Maintenance/Admin. As fully pointed out in the 1973-74 WESTPAC Cruise Report, the administration and maintenance required for F4J flight operations while based ashore at NAS Cubi Point is a marginal, slipshod operation. Massive infusion of support in every quadrant is necessary to accomplish safe, professional flight operations and aircraft maintenance. No one organization can be singled out as not providing its share of the needed support, but rather, a general radical improvement in the below listed areas is called for:

Communications
Ground Support Equipment

Supply
Transportation
Hangar and Working Spaces
Eating Facilities
Head and Washing Facilities

Additionally, the requirement for split units aboard ship and ashore require their own watch and support structure, and greatly weaken manpower commitments. Cubi Point support was not up to the demands placed on it. The situation was further aggravated when OPREADY aircraft deteriorated in-port due to limited support and were put to sea following heavy in-port flying commitments. To illustrate this point, during one in-port period in which no operational commitments needed to be met, the Squadron was able to work off almost all aircraft "UP" GRIPES and fine tune every BW system, in addition to performing all routine maintenance functions. The need to keep ready aircraft aboard ship in-port placed a strain on normal maintenance by resultant requirements. A mutually exclusive situation then was set up which required maximum exercise of those aircraft ashore, while those aboard deteriorated.

c. The following areas are in need of improvement or implementation:

(1) Quantities of GSE of all types are greatly needed at Midway Hangar. Some relief has been available in the form of ship's assets, however, the loan of these subsequently prevents much shipboard preventative maintenance.

(2) The F-4 has a propensity for fuel quantity problems. Scheduling defuels is very difficult at best and generally takes several hours. A great improvement in this area is necessary and applies equally to shipboard and shorebased operations.

(3) Meal passes are not honored consistently at Cubi Point. This vital area was consistently in a state of flux and could have been handled more smoothly.

(4) Vehicular transportation for check-out was completely inadequate. Transportation for maintenance purposes had to be begged, or paid for in the form of rental cars and taxi cabs. Busses that were scheduled, often failed to meet posted departure and arrival times.

(5) COMRATS readjustments from sea to shore were never timely and caused many personal hardships.

(6) The Beach Detachment corrosion control hangar is sorely in need of resupply. Its scheduling was allowed to be monopolized and with a high number of no shows placed a hardship on this squadron's dynamic corrosion control program.

(7) The scheduling of beach detachment corrosion control facilities needs to be re-thought out. Currently, an aircraft cannot be sprayed even minimally with primer in the elephant quonset and must be towed to the paint hangar instead, then back to the elephant hut for finish prep, and then back to the paint hangar. All this time, Grade IV spraying is allowed in the elephant hut. Grade IV spraying is a much bigger undertaking than priming.

(8) Ship-to-shore communications when KITTY HAWK is at sea or in port is very poor. The beach detachment seldom gets the ship's operating schedule in a timely manner. There is an inadequate number of shore lines. Walkie-talkies are practically out of range from Alava Pier to Midway Hangar. Use of the RASPBERRY could not be relied on.